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Abstract—Despite years of intensive research in the field of
software vulnerabilities discovery, exploits are becoming ever
more common. Consequently, it is more necessary than ever
to choose software configurations that minimize systems’ ex-
posure surface to these threats. In order to support users in
assessing the security risks induced by their software config-
urations and in making informed decisions, we introduce M-
STAR, a Modular Software Trustworthiness ARchitecture and
framework for probabilistically assessing the trustworthiness of
software systems, based on evidence, such as their vulnerability
history and source code properties.
Integral to M-STAR is a software trustworthiness model,
consistent with the concept of computational trust. Compu-
tational trust models are rooted in Bayesian probability and
Dempster-Shafer Belief theory, offering mathematical sound-
ness and expressiveness to our framework. To evaluate our
framework, we instantiate M-STAR for Debian Linux pack-
ages, and investigate real-world deployment scenarios. In our
experiments with real-world data, M-STAR could assess the
relative trustworthiness of complete software configurations
with an error of less than 10%. Due to its modular design,
our proposed framework is agile, as it can incorporate future
advances in the field of code analysis and vulnerability pre-
diction. Our results point out that M-STAR can be a valuable
tool for system administrators, regular users and developers,
helping them assess and manage risks associated with their
software configurations.
1. Introduction
Modern software systems comprise a multitude of inter-
acting components developed by different developers. The
security of such systems is of foremost importance, as they
are used in various critical aspects of our everyday lives,
such as telecommunications, hospitals, transportations, etc.
The recent (May 2017) “WannaCry” exploit [1] showed the
scale of disruption even a known and patched vulnerability
can incur. This exploit was made possible because of a
vulnerability in Microsoft’s implementation of the SMB
server that allowed remote attackers to execute arbitrary
code on the victim’s machine. The vulnerability was dis-
closed by Microsoft in March 2017 (CVE-2017-0144) but
the machines that were left unpatched were the targets of the
attack that cost an estimated $8 Billion in system downtime,
according to a recent report [2]. The fact that known and
patched vulnerabilities can cause such great disturbance is
an indicator that yet unknown vulnerabilities (zero-days),
which can potentially affect billions of devices, are a great
danger. Zero-day exploits are a major attack vector and over
20 thousand new vulnerabilities were discovered through
HackerOne’s bug bounty program in 2016 alone, according
to the same report, while the amount of CVEs reported in
2017 were more than double compared to any previous year.
The threat of software exploits is therefore at an all-time
high, even though the security community has come up with
various defense mechanisms to locate and fix vulnerabili-
ties, including formal verification, static/dynamic analysis of
code and fuzzing. Formal verification of software is a way to
achieve very strong security guarantees, effectively render-
ing vulnerabilities impossible. However, formal verification
incurs high overhead, requires manual labor, and is meant to
be applied on inherently high-risk components, such as the
ones implementing cryptographic protocols. Interestingly, in
reality, even cryptographic components such as openssl are
not formally verified, as they include numerous optimiza-
tions. Consequently, in recent years, the research community
has produced several advances on automated vulnerability
discovery. State of the art static analysis tools, like the
ones described in [4], [5], [6] offer ways to check software
for possible vulnerabilities pre-release by pinpointing risky
code segments. Additionally, there has been no lack of
progress in the field of dynamic analysis and fuzzing tools,
e.g. [7], [8], [9], that discover vulnerabilities via testing
the runtime behaviour of the program. Even after applying
various proactive pre-release measures, as mentioned above,
large end-products most often contain vulnerabilities. This
is evident by the high rate of security patching found in
almost all big software products. These vulnerabilities can
in turn lead to major security exploits.
Hence, it is necessary to quantify associated risks and
assess the trustworthiness of software components, so as,
among others, (i) users and system administrators can make
decisions regarding which software components to install,
(ii) companies can assess and attest the trustworthiness of
employee devices having access to sensitive data and (iii)
developers can make decisions regarding which components
to use as dependencies for their software. Towards this goal,
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
05
76
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
7 J
an
 20
18
we propose a novel software trustworthiness framework
that can process evidence regarding the security history
of isolated software components and complex software
systems. Our framework is designed in a modular
fashion in order to adapt to the requirements of the
user, can take into account additional available evidence
(e.g. static analysis results), and can readily incorporate
future advances in prediction mechanisms. Central to our
approach are prediction techniques and computational trust
models, together with operators that enhance these models
in order to handle system-wide trustworthiness assessments.
Our Contributions: The contributions of this paper
can be summarized by the following points:
• An intuitive and mathematically grounded trust
model for software.
• A deep learning based vulnerability prediction tech-
nique, harnessing historical evidence.
• A modular architecture for secure software trust-
worthiness assessment, incorporating our model and
prediction results.
• A detailed analysis of the vulnerability landscape of
Debian. trustworthiness.
• An application of our framework on real-world sys-
tems.
In this paper, we present a novel modular architecture for
assessing software trustworthiness based on the security
history of software. We also implement a proof-of-concept
system for assessing the trustworthiness of systems con-
sisting of Debian Linux packages. As part of our deep
investigation of the Debian vulnerability landscape, we came
to the conclusion that the current practice of vulnerability
discovery is like scratching off the tip of an iceberg; it
rises up a little, but we (the security community) are not
making any visible progress. Motivated by this result, we
propose an approach to calculate the trustworthiness of a
software component (e.g. the Linux kernel, openssl, Firefox,
etc.) w.r.t. the vulnerabilities predicted to affect the specific
component in the future. In order to predict vulnerabilities,
we consider past security evidence that are mined from
publicly accessible vulnerability repositories, such as the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and Debian Security
Advisories (DSA). We then proceed to compare different
predictive mechanisms for future vulnerabilities w.r.t. their
accuracy. Our deep learning technique, employing LSTMs
achieves almost 20% better performance than the other
proposed heuristic methods. The resulting predictions are
fed to a novel, formal probabilistic trust model that takes
into account the projected (un)certainty of the predictions.
Then, we show how to combine the component-wise trust-
worthiness assessments to system-wide trust scores, and
communicate this scores using an intuitive trust visualization
framework to the user.
The long-term utility of our approach stems from its
modular architecture. Our trust model can accommodate
predictions coming from various different prediction
techniques as input. For example, recent advances in
applying machine learning for software security, show
great promise and future prediction methodologies can
straightforwardly be incorporated in our system.
Paper Organization:
After going through some necessary background knowledge
in section 2, we present a high level overview of our system
in section 3. Then, we study the security ecosystem of
Debian in section 4, and proceed with our prediction
analysis in section 5. Next, we present our software trust
model in section 6, before we apply our framework to
real-world system configurations 7. Finally, we go over the
related work in section 8 and conclude in section 9.
2. Background
In this section we briefly go over some necessary mate-
rial for the comprehension of the paper.
2.1. Bugs, vulnerabilities and exploits
Real-world security incidents, i.e. exploits, are attributed
to flaws in the source code of software products. Generally,
flaws in the source code of a program are referred to as
bugs. The subset of bugs that can lead to security exploits
are distinguished as vulnerabilities. We do not make a dis-
tinction between accidentally created vulnerabilities (regular
bugs) and maliciously placed ones (back-doors). Exploits
can take advantage either of publicly known, yet unpatched
vulnerabilities, or of yet unknown vulnerabilities. The latter
are known as zero-day vulnerabilities. Protecting computer
systems against known vulnerabilities comes down to ef-
fectively applying patches to the systems, while protection
against zero-day vulnerabilities is more difficult, relying on
the correct choice of software, in order to minimize the
inherent risk.
2.2. The Debian Linux distribution
Debian GNU/Linux is a particular distribution of the
Linux operating system, and numerous packages that run
on it [10]. There are over 40, 000 software packages avail-
able through the Debian distribution at present and users
can choose which of them to install on their system. All
packages included in Debian are open source and free to
redistribute, usually under the terms of the GNU General
Public License [11].
Security incidents, i.e. vulnerabilities, are handled in a
transparent manner by the Debian security team [12]. The
security team reviews incident notifications for the stable
release and after working on the related patches, publishes
a Debian Security Advisory (DSA).
2.3. Predictive analytics
Predicting future events is of paramount importance to
trust and risk assessment methodologies. In our context, the
events in question are security incidents (vulnerabilities)
affecting software components, and more specifically for
the case of our study, Debian packages. Consequently, our
problem can be viewed as a time-series prediction problem,
where we want to predict the number of vulnerabilities of
a software component in the future by taking advantage of
its vulnerability history, and optionally, some other related
information that is available (e.g. stemming from static
analysis).
There exist a variety of forecasting techniques for time-
series data. These can vary from basic simple predictors
based on universal observations, e.g. average or weighted
average of the observations, to linear autoregressive models,
e.g. so called ARIMA models. Additionally, recent advances
in using machine learning techniques on various predictive
tasks, including in software security, indicate that supervised
learning models, such as Support Vector Machines (SVMs)
often provide good predictions, although they have been
mainly applied in classification problems. Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) neural networks have gained momentum
in the last couple of years in tasks related to the fore-
casting of time-dependent processes in various scientific
and industrial fields. LSTMs are recurrent artificial neural
networks whose units are designed to remember values for
long or short periods, making them especially suitable for
the prediction of the next steps in a time-series. In this
paper, we employ LSTMs and evaluate their effectiveness in
the context of vulnerability prediction based on a software
component’s history.
2.4. Computational trust
Computational trust provides means to support entities
make informed decisions in electronic environments, where
decisions are often subject to risk and uncertainty. Research
in computational trust addresses the formal modeling, as-
sessment, and management of the social notion of trust for
use in risky electronic environments. Examples of such risky
environments span from social networks to cloud computing
service ecosystems [13]. In theory, trust is usually reasoned
in terms of the relationship within a specific context be-
tween a trustor and a trustee, where the trustor is a subject
that trusts a target entity, which is referred to as trustee.
Mathematically, trust is an estimate by the trustor of the
inherent quality of the trustee, i.e., the quality of another
party to act beneficially or at least non-detrimentally to the
relying party. This estimate is based on evidence about the
trustee’s behaviour in the past, in the case of M-STAR past
vulnerabilities and characteristics of software.
CertainTrust [14] (and its accompanying algebra of op-
erators, CertainLogic [15]) or Subjective Logic [16] provide
mathematically grounded models (consistent with Bayesian
statistics) to represent and compute trustworthiness under
uncertain probabilities. In this paper, we use CertainTrust
and CertainLogic for trust representation and computation
respectively, although Subjective Logic can also be used. In
CertainTrust, trustworthiness is represented by a construct
called opinion (o). Opinions express the truth of a statement
or proposition. The opinion is a tuple, i.e. o = (t, c, f).
Here, the trust value t indicates the most likely value for
the estimated parameter (in Bayesian terms, the mode of
the posterior distribution). It can depend on the relative
frequency of observations or pieces of evidence supporting
the truth of a proposition. The certainty value c indicates the
degree to which the t is assumed to be representative for the
future (associated to the credible interval). The higher the
certainty (c) of an opinion is, the higher the influence of the
trust value (t), on the expectation value E (trustworthiness
score), in relation to the initial expectation value (f ). The
parameter f expresses the assumption about the truth of a
proposition in absence of evidence (prior distribution). The
expectation value (trustworthiness score), E, is calculated
as follows: E = t · c+(1− c) ·f . E expresses an estimation
of trustworthiness considering t, c, and f .
CertainLogic, based on the CertainTrust model, provides
mathematical operators to aggregate multiple opinions (sup-
porting the truth of propositions) considering uncertainty
and conflict. It offers a set of standard operators like ANDct
(∧ct), ORct (∨ct), and NOT ct (¬ct) as well as non-standard
operators like Consensus (⊕), Discounting (⊗), and Fusion
(⊕̂). The standard operators are defined to combine opinions
associated with propositions that are independent. The non-
standard operators are defined to combine opinions associ-
ated with propositions that can also be dependent.
3. System Architecture
Our main goal is to develop a modular architecture
that is intuitive and easily extensible. Thus, we identify
five core components of our system, as shown in Figure 1.
We now proceed to the specification of the components in
a high level and in the next sections we elaborate on the
approaches and solutions used in this paper.
Figure 1. System Architecture
DATA
MODULE
PREDICTION
MODULE
TRUST
MODULE
VISUALIZATION
MODULE
INTERFACE MODULE
Input: List of software components
- candidates and inter-relations
Interface Module:
The Interface module provides information about which
components comprise the system under evaluation, along
with information about their inter-dependencies. As part
of the Interface module, an attestation protocol (e.g. [17])
can be implemented to guarantee that the data provided as
input has not been tampered with.
Data Module:
The Data module consists of the evidence-gathering
mechanisms employed by the framework implementation.
In our instantiation of M-STAR, we mine the Debian
Security Advisories and NVD’s CVE reports for past
vulnerabilities of the software components.
Prediction Module:
The Prediction module includes the data analysis mechanism
used to predict future vulnerabilities of the components.
This mechanism can range from simple averaging models
to complex machine learning approaches.
Trust Module:
The Trust module is responsible for modeling and
calculating the trustworthiness of each component. The
module also combines individual assessments to system-
wide trustworthiness values, depending on the configuration
of the target system.
Visualization Module:
The Visualization module serves the important purpose
of communicating the resulting trustworthiness scores to
the user or system administrator. The module provides
intuitive and comprehensible graphical as well as numerical
interfaces in order to assist their decision making.
4. Vulnerabilities in large software projects
Our framework requires good-quality (i.e. correct and
complete) sources of data regarding past vulnerabilities
of software components. Therefore, a well-organized and
maintained security report repository is required. Such vul-
nerability repositories are maintained by entities such as
large companies (e.g. big software vendors like Microsoft,
or anti-virus companies), intelligence agencies, or big open-
source projects. For our deployment, we choose the Debian
distribution of GNU/Linux as the focus of our efforts, based
on the comprehensive variety of software offered as part of
it, and its transparent, open, and security-focused order of
operation.
4.1. Vulnerabilities in Debian
In this section, we present an overview of the Debian
ecosystem w.r.t. its security characteristics and draw some
interesting conclusions. We collected our data (implementa-
tion of the Data Module) from the DSAs and NIST’s NVD1.
In Fig. 13, we see the distribution of vulnerabilities among
1. https://nvd.nist.gov/
source packages of Debian for the years 2001-2016. In the
figure, packages that had at least two vulnerabilities in the
specified time frame are included, yielding a total of 619
source packages. An additional 540 source packages had
a single vulnerability and were not included in the figure
for readability reasons (the complete figure is available in
the appendix). It is interesting to notice that the distribution
is characteristically heavy-tailed (notice that the y axis is
logarithmic) with a few source packages dominating the
total vulnerabilities reported and a long tail of a large
number of packages with only a few vulnerabilities. Inter-
estingly, inspecting the plot (Fig. 3) of the data in (double)
logarithmic axes, we can observe a straight line, indicative
of a power-law distribution. In short, we observe that the
majority of vulnerabilities is concentrated in a small set
of source packages, and therefore the trustworthiness of
software systems largely depends on which of those high-
risk packages those systems use.
Table 1 presents the 20 top vulnerable Debian source
packages of all time. An automated procedure was estab-
lished to collect the vulnerabilities reported for previous
versions of a package and attribute them to the current
version of the package in the stable distribution. Manual
checks and small corrections were subsequently performed.
The Linux kernel, as probably expected, is the most vulner-
able component, followed by the two main browsers in use
(Firefox2 and Chromium3). The total number of vulnerabil-
ities reported in the 16 year period was 10 747, meaning the
Linux kernel accounts for more than 10 percent of the total.
During the previous two years (2015-2016), a total of 2 339
vulnerabilities were reported, with Chromium being by far
the most affected package, accounting for 297 vulnerabilities
compared to the next most vulnerable package (Firefox)
which was affected by 153. The Linux kernel, in that time
period was affected by 144 vulnerabilities, which is roughly
6 percent of the total.
Concerning the total number of vulnerabilities reported
in the Debian ecosystem w.r.t. time, Fig. 4 shows a clear
upward trend as the years go by. Can this mean that the
security quality of the software is decreasing, despite the
considerable effort of security researchers and professionals?
One could argue, that the amount of software packages
of Debian increased dramatically in recent years and this
is the cause of the increase in the total amount of vul-
nerabilities reported. The line of thought would be, that
with such a large number of packages, even one or two
bugs that slipped the security measures of the individual
maintainers, would contribute to a big yearly sum. That
would be a reasonable assumption, as the stable version
of Debian released in 2002 (Woody) contained only 8 500
binary packages, going up to 18 000 packages with the
release of Etch in 2007, significantly increasing to 36 000
in 2013 (Wheezy) and peaking at 52 000 with the current
stable version (Stretch) released in June 2017. However, we
2. Firefox ESR (Extended Support Release) is the version of Mozilla
Firefox packaged in Debian
3. Chromium consists of the open-source code-base of the proprietary
Google Chrome browser (https://www.chromium.org/)
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Figure 2. The distribution of vulnerabilities in the Debian ecosystem (years 2001-2016). The scale of axis y is logarithmic. Only packages with at least
two vulnerabilities are taken into account. Every tenth package name appears on the x axis for space reasons.
TABLE 1. THE TOP TWENTY PACKAGES WITH THE MOST
VULNERABILITIES IN TIME PERIODS (I) 2001-2016 AND (II)
2015-2016, ALONG WITH THE RESPECTIVE RANKS OF THE SOURCE
PACKAGES W.R.T. THEIR VULNERABILITIES.
Source package name # total rank total # 15-16 rank 15-16
linux 1303 1 144 3
firefox-esr 815 2 153 2
chromium-browser 496 3 297 1
openjdk-8 353 4 121 4
icedove 347 5 89 5
wireshark 261 6 87 6
php7.0 258 7 86 7
mysql-transitional 221 8 63 10
xulrunner 211 9 – –
iceape 178 10 – –
openssl 145 11 50 13
qemu 134 12 70 8
xen 113 13 52 12
wordpress 110 14 38 15
tomcat8 99 15 48 14
imagemagick 95 16 57 11
krb5 89 17 10 39
typo3-src 77 18 1 151-253
ruby2.3 75 19 5 56-69
postgresql-9.6 75 20 19 22
found evidence supporting the opposite. Interestingly, the
number of vulnerabilities per package (among the packages
that had a vulnerability reported for the specified year) also
follows an upward trend, a fact straightforwardly deduced
from Fig. 5. In the latter figure we can even see a smoother,
clearer upward trend compared to Fig. 4, although the
slope of the trend is nearly identical. These observations,
together with our previous assessment that the distribution
of vulnerabilities among the packages of Debian can be
attributed to a power law generation mechanism, indicate
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Figure 3. A log-log plot of the distribution of Fig. 13.
that there are specific packages that continue to have large
numbers of vulnerabilities for prolonged periods of time. Is
there an explanation for this phenomenon or are we (security
researchers) doing such a bad job? One possible glimmer
of hope would be if vulnerabilities were induced by soft-
ware upgrades and the number of vulnerabilities affecting
a specific version of a package gradually dropped to zero.
An intuitive hypothesis would be that at least for certain
stable versions of a package, the rate of vulnerabilities will
eventually decrease. In order to test the claim that specific
versions of a package reach a relatively secure state (few
vulnerabilities reported per quarter) and that subsequent vul-
nerabilities that are attributed to the package are caused by
updates, we perform a case study on two popular packages,
namely PHP and OpenJDK, which recently underwent major
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Figure 4. Total vulnerabilities reported in Debian per calendar year (2001-
2016).
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Figure 5. Average vulnerabilities per package (that had at least one security
incident in that year) in Debian per calendar year (2001-2016).
version changes. The hypothesis is that each major version
of a package becomes more secure as time passes, as a
result of the hard work of the security community and that
a considerable amount of new vulnerabilities affect only
the new code inserted with the major updates. To test this
hypothesis we inspected the vulnerabilities reported for the
newer versions of the packages and checked if they also
affect older versions.
PHP:
PHP is a popular server-side scripting language that is used
by 83% of all websites whose server-side programming
language is known, according to W3Techs 4 (measured in
November 2017). Several PHP versions have been packaged
4. https://w3techs.com/technologies/details/pl-php/all/all
in Debian, traditionally following the source package name
phpx, where x is the version number. We will look into
the transition from php5 to the next version php7 5 (php6
never made it to the public). The vulnerability history of
php5 indicates that the component is relatively hardened
at the time the next version is released. The vulnerability
discovery rate is relatively low and stable for the last months
before the launch of php7. According to the hypothesis, we
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Figure 6. Vulnerabilities of package php5, during its presence in the stable
release, before and after the introduction of the next version (php7) in
testing. Vulnerability rate: (a) before the launch of the new version: ≈
4 vulnerabilities/quarter; (b) after the launch of the new version: ≈ 10
vulnerabilities/quarter.
expect a good amount of vulnerabilities after this point to
affect the new version (php7) of the software and not older
versions (php5.x). On the contrary, we observe that indeed
we have a substantial hike in vulnerabilities reported due
to the launch of the new version, however, most of those
vulnerabilities were there from the previous version. The
launch of the new version may have instigated researchers
and bug hunters to look for vulnerabilities induced by the
new code, but instead what they found were already ex-
isting vulnerabilities from previous versions. After manual
inspection of all security incidents tracked by the Debian
Security Bug Tracker6, which also tracks vulnerabilities of
packages in the testing distribution, we found that in the
time window of January 2016 - November 2017, out of the
93 vulnerabilities that affected php7, 78 of them (84%) also
affected version 5 of the software (4 of the 78 did not affect
version 5.4 and only affected version 5.6).
OpenJDK:
OpenJDK is an open source implementation of the Java
Platform (Standard Edition), and since version 7, the official
reference implementation of Java. We repeat the experiment
performed with PHP, with OpenJDK versions 7 and 8.
5. Official package name php7.0
6. https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/
Version 7 was introduced into the testing distribution of
Debian in September 2011 and became part of the stable
distribution in May 2013 (Debian Wheezy). It remained part
of the stable until the release of stretch (June 2017). The next
version, OpenJDK-8, became part of the testing distribution
in May 2015 and became part of stable with Debian stretch
(June 2017), replacing version 7. In Figure 7, we see the
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Figure 7. Vulnerabilities of package openjdk-7, during its presence in
the stable release, before and after the introduction of the next version
(openjdk-8) in testing. Vulnerability rate: (a) before the launch of the new
version: ≈ 11.3 vulnerabilities/quarter; (b) after the launch of the new
version: ≈ 10.6 vulnerabilities/quarter.
vulnerabilities of version 7 before and after the introduction
of the next version. Again, we see no significant decline
in the rate of vulnerability reports, and the introduction of
the next version seems to contribute to the discovery of
vulnerabilities of the previous version. To put things into
perspective, out of a total of 38 vulnerabilities that were
reported for openjdk-8 in the time span of June-November
2017, only 2 did not affect version 7 (although these are
not depicted in Figure 7 because version 7 was removed
from stable in the meantime), and most of them (31/38)
also affected version 6, which was introduced in the testing
distribution in 2008.
Debian Wheezy:
Although, the detailed investigation of vulnerabilities for
PHP and OpenJDK gave us some useful insights about
the current state of software quality, these results cannot
be generalized to other packages. In order to get a more
complete view of the effect of new vulnerabilities on older
versions, we study the security history of a single stable
release of Debian, including its Long-Term Support (LTS)
phase7. For this study, we chose Debian 7 (Wheezy) that was
release in May 2013 and at the moment of writing is still
supported from the LTS team (planned support until May
7. Starting from 2014, Debian includes an LTS program, in order to
extend support for any release to at least 5 years in total.
2018). In Figure 8, we see the distribution of vulnerabilities
per quarter, starting from the release of Wheezy, until the
time of writing (November 2017). Even for a specific stable
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Figure 8. Vulnerabilities that affected packages of the Wheezy Debian
release. *During the time window from Q2/2015 to Q2/2016, both Debian
7 and 8 were supported by the regular security team, and therefore, the
amounts presented in the figure are a higher bound, as some vulnerabilities
may have affected only the newer release.
release of Debian, we can observe a clear upward trend that
continues in the LTS phase of the software. These results
support our findings for individual packages and show that
the rate of vulnerabilities is not decreasing, and to the
contrary is slightly increasing over time, even for a specific
stable release.
Conclusions:
In this section, we investigated the distribution of vulnerabil-
ities in the Debian ecosystem. After detailed examination of
the vulnerabilities reported for both individual widely used
packages (PHP and OpenJDK), and a specific stable release
of Debian, we conclude that the number of vulnerabilities
does not decrease over time, even for software that has
been stable for many years. To the contrary, we discerned
a relatively stable rate of vulnerabilities, that shows signs
of increase over time. In other words, we are still in the
phase of the more we look - the more we find. Maybe
our vulnerability-finding efforts are like cutting off the tip
of an iceberg; it rises up a little, but we are not making
any visible progress. Although automated security tools and
manual security inspection are becoming more widespread
and effective, we have not reached the point of curbing the
vulnerability rate. Our results draw interesting comparisons
to studies performed over a decade ago. Rescorla claimed in
[18] that there was no clear evidence that finding vulnerabil-
ities made software more secure, and that even the opposite
may be true, i.e. that finding vulnerabilities, given that their
rate is not decreasing, leads to more risk than good, by
allowing hackers to attack unpatched systems. Another study
from 2006 by Ozment and Schechter [19] found evidence
of a decrease in the vulnerability rate of the base OpenBSD
system in a 7.5 year interval. Our results show that, more
than a decade later, this is not generally true for Debian as
a whole and for PHP and OpenJDK individually. After the
impressive growth of the security community since 2006, we
still do not have strong evidence that the security quality of
software is increasing.
Remark. The Debian Security Team publishes DSAs for
important vulnerabilities that command immediate patches
of the packages. These are a subset of the vulnerabilities that
have an associated CVE. Therefore, the numbers presented
in the above section, can generally be seen as a lower
bound. Furthermore, the security team does not differentiate
between the vulnerabilities that were deemed important
enough to command a DSA, e.g. by using a CVSS severity
score [20]. In our analysis, we also did not take into account
the severity score of vulnerabilities as reported in CVEs,
preferring to follow the judgement of the Debian Security
Team on which vulnerabilities need an urgent fix. However,
using severity data for vulnerabilities may allow us to draw
other interesting conclusions in the future.
5. Predicting future vulnerabilities
Our aim is to predict future zero-day vulnerabilities of
software components (in our instantiation Debian packages),
based on their vulnerability history, mined from public and
open vulnerability databases. In this section, we present a
formalization of the problem via an abstract functionality,
along with the realization of this functionality by three
different prediction techniques. We then proceed to com-
pare those techniques on real-world data and discuss their
performance.
5.1. Problem statement and experimental setting
The abstract formulation of our problem can be seen
in Fig. 9. On input, a list of time series TS, containing
the vulnerability histories of the software components under
study for m time windows, the validation size (in time steps)
k, and the expected prediction window into the future l, the
functionality outputs a list of predictions Pred and a list
of corresponding future error estimates Errors. Our goal
is to predict the number of vulnerabilities in well-defined
future intervals, e.g. the expected number of vulnerabilities
of a software component in the next 9 months. Our dataset
consists of vulnerability data of Debian packages, as already
mentioned. Vulnerabilities are grouped in a per-month basis,
with all data of the years 2001-2016 as input, and data for
the year 2017 as output. In this section, we study and com-
pare 3 prediction techniques, namely (i) a simple average
function on the history of the package, (ii) a more advanced
exponentially weighted average giving higher weights to
the most recent history of the packages, and finally (iii)
an LSTM neural network, which represents the state of the
art in machine learning techniques for on time-related data.
The Prediction functionality
– Input:
i. A list of time-series TS = {ts1, · · · , tsn}, where
n is the total number of software components. For
each time-series: tsi, i∈{1,··· ,n} = 〈v(i,1), · · · , v(i,m)〉,
where v(i,j) is the number of vulnerabilities of com-
ponent i for the time window tj .
ii. A list of validation samples V = {val1, · · · , valn},
where vali, i∈{1,··· ,n} = 〈v(i,m+1), · · · , v(i,m+k)〉.
iii. An expected prediction window l.
– Output:
i. A list of predictions Pred = {pred1, · · · , predn},
where predi, i∈{1,··· ,n} =
̂l∑
j=1
vm+k+j .
ii. A list of error estimates Errors = {e1, · · · , en},
where each ei, i∈{1,··· ,n} = ̂error(predi), where
error() is an error metric, e.g. absolute distance, nor-
malized root mean squared error (nrmse) etc.
Figure 9. The abstract prediction functionality.
Average: The simplest prediction technique we imple-
mented is the average function on the vulnerability history
of the packages. The intuition behind this approach is that
software components have some characteristics that define
their security behaviour and these characteristics are gen-
erally stable. Additionally, our observations in the detailed
analysis performed in the previous section, reinforce this
intuition.
Weighted average: The second method we implemented is
an exponentially weighted average function. The weighting
allows us to take into account changes to the behaviour of
the package that happen over an extended period of time.
LSTM: By using LSTMs we aspire to capture changes to
the behaviour of software components with fine granularity.
We train a separate LSTM model for each package by using
the packages vulnerability history from Q1/2001-Q1/2016 as
the training set, the data from Q2-Q4/2016 as the validation
set which also produces the future error estimate, while we
make predictions for time windows in 2017 (Q1-Q3), as
seen in Figure 10. We implemented our prediction module
in around 400 lines of python code, by using the Keras8 open
source neural network library. The LSTM that provided the
predictions that follow is a stateful one, consisting of 10
neurons. We divided the vulnerabilities in monthly intervals
and applied a rolling average function, as a pre-processing
step of the input time series. We also configured the network
to look 3 steps (months) in the past, in order to generate
a prediction. We trained 5 models for each package and
selected the one that yielded the minimum validation interval
error, for our final predictions.
8. https://keras.io/
t2001 2016 2017 2018
Training Validation Test
Figure 10. Experiment timeline partition
5.2. Prediction Results
In Table 2, we see the prediction results of the LSTM
method for the 10 most vulnerable packages of all time that
are part of the Debian stretch (stable) distribution. To judge
the prediction accuracy of the neural network, we compare
the root mean squared error (rmse) of the method over the
top 136 packages (packages that have more than 10 vulner-
abilities reported), with the other proposed methods, namely
the average function and the weighted average function. As
we can see in Table 3, the LSTM achieves an rmse of
14.66, whereas the next most accurate method, the weighted
average one, achieves an error of 18.07. This translates to
19% better accuracy for the neural network implementation,
or inversely 23% larger error for the weighted average
technique, which we consider substantial. Additionally, as
the optimization of the neural network was considered out
of the scope of this paper, we believe that there is still
potential for significantly improved accuracy. However, we
also believe that there is a natural bound to the accuracy of
the predictions we can generate, as the vulnerability discov-
ery process has some inherent unpredictability. The required
error estimate for a component (package) i (see Figure 9)
is calculated as the normalized error of the prediction for
the validation period, i.e. the last 9 months of 2016 in this
case, as follows:
error(predi) =

|v̂i,m+k−vi,m+k|
vi,max−vi,min , vi,max − vi,min > 1
|v̂i,m+k − vi,m+k| , else
(1)
TABLE 2. PREDICTION RESULTS OF LSTM MODEL - PREDICTION
WINDOW IS 9 MONTHS (JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2017)
Package Rank Predicted Actual Future Error exp.
linux 1 35 70 0.034
firefox-esr 2 54 84 0.08
chromium-browser 3 80 74 0.293
openjdk-8 4 14 42 0.196
icedove 5 24 58 0.408
wireshark 6 12 11 0.136
php7.0 7 14 5 0.821
mysql-transitional 8 11 32 0.136
openssl 9 3 3 0.491
qemu 10 6 11 0.674
5.3. Remarks
We conclude this section with several remarks regarding
the prediction methodology and results.
TABLE 3. ROOT MEAN SQUARED ERROR OF DIFFERENT PREDICTION
TECHNIQUES ON THE TOP 136 VULNERABLE PACKAGES OF DEBIAN
Technique rmse error w.r.t. best %
LSTM 14.66 –
Average 18.65 +27%
Weighted average 18.07 +23%
Threats to validity: We decided to take into account data
only regarding the past security incidents of a software
component. Therefore, we overcame threats like models
generating good predictions only for certain programming
languages or types of components. However, the ground
truth at our disposal consists only of the vulnerabilities
reported and in some cases this set of vulnerabilities might
be different with the set of vulnerabilities discovered. Still,
we believe that a transparent and open software management
environment is a good direction towards making the two
aforementioned sets converge.
Computational performance: Regarding the time and com-
putational resources required to generate our predictions,
as expected the average and weighted average approaches
required negligible resources, while the deep neural network
deployed required on average 5.3 minutes to generate and
apply the models for each package running on a commodity
laptop (Intel i5 cpu, 8 GB RAM). Note that re-computation
of the assessments need only be performed when significant
new data becomes available and can be scheduled, e.g. in
a monthly basis. Therefore, even the overhead incurred by
the neural network can be considered very small.
6. Software Trustworthiness Model
In order to assess the security quality of a software
system, we propose a trust model that considers past be-
haviour of underlying components as well as their inter-
dependencies within that system. The model is rooted from
an extended version of Bayesian statistics, namely Certain-
Trust and CertainLogic (see Section 2.4). Our proposed
model considers the probability estimate of software pack-
age vulnerabilities and the inherent certainty of the estimated
probability as inputs to the CertainTrust representation (see
Section 2.4). This means that the probability estimate (re-
garding vulnerabilities) of a software component can be
mapped to the parameter, t, the certainty of the aforemen-
tioned probability estimate can be mapped to the parameter,
c, and prior knowledge about the software component under
assessment can be mapped to the parameter, f . In the
upcoming sections, we formally devise our probabilistic
model for software component trustworthiness, as well as
for the assessment of complex software systems with inter-
dependent components.
6.1. Single component trust model
In this section, we model trust for individual software
components. First, we define the quality of a software com-
ponent. Second, we define the expected trustworthiness of
a component, consistent with Bayesian statistical inference,
and compatible with the parameters of the CertainTrust rep-
resentation. Last, we prove that the expected trustwothiness
assigned to a software component is an optimal estimator
of the quality of that component.
Definition 1 (Software component quality). We define the
quality Qi,tp of a software component i as the probability
that this component will not be found vulnerable in the next
well-defined time period of tp time steps. The complementary
probability 1−Qi,tp is the security risk Ri,tp associated with
the component.
Qi,tp = Pr[i not vulnerable]
for t ∈ (tnow, tnow + tp) (2)
Ri,tp = 1−Qi,tp for t ∈ (tnow, tnow + tp) (3)
Our goal is to assess the quality of a component in future
time intervals. We use the predictions generated by the pre-
diction module of our tool as a point estimate for the number
of vulnerabilities. Our prediction module predicts the num-
ber of vulnerabilities a software component i will have in the
next l time steps, with l = λtp, λ ∈ N and λ 1. The time
period of l (e.g. l = 9 months in our use-case) is relatively
small in comparison to the total history of a software com-
ponent and therefore we assume that vulnerabilities follow a
Binomial distribution (Bernoulli process) with tp time steps
between each trial. Note that this assumption is used solely
for modeling purposes in order to construct a measure of
trustworthiness. Assuming a Bernoulli trial each tp, we can
estimate the quality of a component by the following:
Ti =
{
1− prediλ if predi ≤ λ
0 if predi > λ
(4)
where predi is the total predicted number of vulnerabilities
for the next l time steps, and the tp argument is suppressed
in the notation. The second part of equation 4 is included
for completeness reasons. In a system deployment scenario
(e.g. see section 6.3), the parameter λ (or equivalently the
parameter tp) is set to a value that practically makes it
impossible to have predi ≤ λ.
We now proceed to define the trustworthiness of a com-
ponent, which is an expectation value about the its quality.
Definition 2 (Software component trustworthiness). We de-
fine the trustworthiness of a software component i as the
expectation E(t, c, f) = t · c + (1 − c) · f associated with
a CertainTrust tuple (t, c, f), where t ∈ [0, 1] is an optimal
point estimation of the component’s quality, c ∈ [0, 1] is a
certainty value for this estimation, and f is a calibrating
factor stemming from a priori knowledge about the compo-
nent.
We take t to be equal to Ti from equation 4. The
certainty value c is derived from the prediction mechanism
used in the scheme. Inspired by [21], in our implementation
we use the normalized error of the prediction model for the
validation phase, as a conservative goodness-of-fit measure
(see Figure 9). Thus, the certainty estimate for a component
i is calculated as:
c = 1−min(error(predi, 1)) (5)
where error(predi) is a normalized error estimate. In our
setting, this value is calculated as per Equation 1.
Theorem 1. Assuming vulnerabilities generate according
to a Bernoulli process during a time period of l time steps,
then equation 4, expressing the trustworthiness of a software
component i, is a Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) of
the quality of the component, as defined in equation 2.
Proof. The average number of vulnerabilities per tp time
steps, during a time period of l, l  tp time steps, prediλ ,
is the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) for the prob-
ability of success of each Bernoulli trial. We have:
predi
λ
=̂ Pr[trial succes] = Pr[i vulnerable]
Thus, the complementary probability, Ti is an MLE of the
component’s quality Qi,tp as expressed in equation 2:
Ti = 1− predi
λ
=̂ Pr[i not vulnerable]
for t ∈ (tnow, tnow + tp)
6.2. Software system trust model
Most modern computing systems consist of multiple
software components. These components can depend on
each other, or they can be configured in a way to give
the system redundancy, i.e. to allow the system to uphold
its security guarantees even if one of the components is
compromised. An example of the latter is a private database
where entries are secret-shared [22] between two or more
machines. The security dependencies found in a software
system can be depicted in a graph, similar to that of Fig-
ure 11. The graph can be straightforwardly expressed via
a propositional logic formula. Setting the atomic formula
ii∈{A,B,C,D,X,Y } to model that the software component i
is safe, i.e. it is not vulnerable, the resulting propositional
formula is:
SY STEM :⇔ B ∧D ∧ [(A ∧ C) ∨ (X ∧ Y )] (6)
Note that the software components are assumed independent
at this stage, i.e. they do not share code. A well-implemented
“divide and conquer“ strategy, like the one enforced by
Debian packaging, would satisfy this assumption. Certain-
Logic’s ANDct and ORct operators (see Definitions 4 and
5) can be used to generalize the propositional logic oper-
ators of Equation 6, leading to our system trustworthiness
definition.
Definition 3 (Software system trustworthiness). The trust-
worthiness of a system S, whose security dependencies
can be expressed by a propositional logic formula with
Figure 11. Security dependencies graph of a complex system.
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no variable repetition (like the one in 6) is defined as the
evaluation of the formula with the propositional logic terms
substituted by CertainTrust terms and the propositional logic
operators substituted by CertainLogic operators. In relaxed
mathematical notation:
if S :⇔ F (a1, · · · , an) , then
TS = F [a
ct
i /ai,∧ct/∧,∨ct/∨]
(7)
where F is a propositional logic formula with variables
a1, · · · , an, which can be brought to a form, so that each
variable appears once. This constraint stems from the fact
that CertainLogic operators, similarly to Subjective Logic
ones, are designed to operate on independent propositions.
Theorem 2. The value assigned to a software system by
the evaluation of equation 7 is a valid expectation of the
quality of the system (seen as a component), as defined in
2. Specifically, the trust value t is a maximum a posteriori
probability (MAP) estimate of the quality of the system.
Proof. From Theorem 1 we have that for each component
a1, · · · , an, its trustworthiness is a valid expectation of its
quality, i.e. the trust value t is an MLE of the compo-
nent’s quality. CertainLogic’s ANDct and ORct operators
are consisted with Bayesian statistics, and therefore pro-
vide MAP estimates for the degree of truth of (a) both
proposition simultaneously and (b) of at least one of the
two propositions, respectively. Therefore, the evaluation of
a CertainTrust logical formula provides an MLE for the truth
value of the underlying reasoning that is in accordance with
propositional logic rules.
Having established a systematic method for calculating
the trustworthiness of complex software systems, starting
from a graph representation (or the equivalent propositional
logic formula), we proceed to examine the issue of ex-
tracting the aforementioned graph representation from real-
world software systems. For example take the case where the
overall system is a database with data secret-shared among
two sub-systems. Due to the secret sharing technique, both
sub-systems would need to be compromised in order for the
overall system to be compromised, i.e. for the data to be
leaked. The naive solution of calculating a trust score for
each subsystem and then combining the two scores using
CertainLogic’s ORct operator would only produce a mean-
ingful result if the two sub-systems did not share any soft-
ware components. This, in general is not the case. Conse-
quently, it is important to carefully construct the system de-
pendency graph before proceeding with the trustworthiness
calculation. To follow on our established example of data
entries secret-shared between two sub-systems, let these sub-
systems consist of the following components: S : {S1, S2},
with S1 : {A,B,C,D} and S2 : {B,D,X, Y }. Following
the notation of this section, the resulting propositional logic
formula for the security of the system as a whole would be:
S = (A∧B∧C∧D)∨(B∧D∧X∧Y ), leading to the simpli-
fied formula already presented in Equation 6 and Figure 11.
Take note that substituting the propositional logic operators
with CertainLogic’s counterparts in the initial formula would
not be possible, due to the appearance of variables more
than once. Although the assumption of being able to express
the propositional logic formula in a form without variable
repetition was satisfied in this example, it is not always the
case. In the case where such a simplification is not possible,
we follow an approach, a variation of which was shown to
be optimal in [23]. Specifically, we express the formula in its
disjunctive normal form and proceed to delete terms until the
formula can be expressed with no variable repetition. The
criteria with which terms are deleted are (a) the resulting
formula has the least number of variable repetitions, and (b)
the term deleted would be the one with the lowest certainty
value if its CertainTrust representation was calculated. The
technique described above is a conservative approach erring
on the side of caution, meaning that the resulting formula
will be harder to satisfy, and thus the resulting score should
be considered a lower bound on the quality of the system.
Fusion of assessments from different sources: It is
generally the case that different combinations of Data and
Prediction modules (see Figure 1) yield different results
for the trustworthiness of the same software component.
For example, an anti-virus company could have its own
database of security incidents, in addition to the publicly
available ones. In addition, it could use a different prediction
technique, e.g. one that includes static analysis of the soft-
ware components. A system administrator should be able to
incorporate the knowledge provided by this source into the
trustworthiness opinion they have already computed using
the means available to them. To this end, CertainLogic’s
fusion operators (see Appendix B) can be used to combine
opinions about the same software components. These oper-
ators have been designed to model e.g., the scenario where
a person gets conflicting recommendations about a product
in an online marketplace. The parallelism to our scenario
is straightforward, and thus these operators naturally fit our
use-case, both from a mathematical and a sociological point
of view.
6.3. Tuning the model
There are some decisions to be made, concerning the
way our model is going to be applied in a real-world
setting. The model parameters need to be set or bounded
by empirical values, so as to have results that closely depict
reality.
Setting the parameter λ: The parameter λ is recom-
mended to be set, so that:
λ >
n∑
i=1
predi
This way, the second part of Equation 4 will not be activated,
even when considering the worst case scenario of a single
system that depends on all the components that are predicted
to be vulnerable. In our scenario, where l is the equivalent
of 9 months, we set λ = 4 · 30 · 9 = 1080, which effectively
means that the expectation value produced by M-STAR is
the probability that a system will be found valuable, sampled
at intervals of six hours.
Limiting value ranges for estimates: All three model
parameters (t,c,f ) are probabilities, therefore they live in
the real interval [0, 1]. However, in a real-world deployment
of M-STAR we may want to limit the range of the values
to a subinterval of [0, 1], in order to avoid corner cases and
produce better results. Specifically, we limit the certainty
estimate range to [0.100, 0.990], with the following reason-
ing. First, due to the normalized error calculation formula,
for packages that have very few vulnerabilities, a reasonably
good prediction can lead to a certainty of 0. Second, even
if a model fits reality perfectly (the error is very close to
0) in the validation interval, it is likely that this will not
be the case for the future prediction, and thus we assume a
possible error margin of 0.01.
Setting prior knowledge value (f): The a priori expecta-
tion of the quality of a component is set empirically, based
on observations we have made on the Debian ecosystem as a
whole. Due to the power-law like distribution of vulnerabili-
ties among Debian’s components (see Figure 13), we decide
to partition the dataset into two, when setting the prior
knowledge value. First, for the top 20 vulnerable packages,
which represent the dominating subset, we set their initial
expectation, as the average number of vulnerabilities of this
group during a two-year interval (2015-2016). For the pack-
ages that had at least one vulnerability in their history, we set
their initial expectation to the normalized average number
of vulnerabilities of those packages in the same two-year
interval (2015-2016). Regarding the two cases mentioned
above, we additionally apply a scaling factor, accounting for
the global observations we have made showcasing that the
average number of vulnerabilities per package is increasing,
and computed by fitting a first order polynomial on the data
of Figure 5. The final value is therefore f ′ = 1.05 ·f−0.05.
For the packages that have no reported vulnerabilities, we
set the initial expectation to 1, i.e. we consider them fully
trustworthy. Apart from the empirical solution provided
here, there could be other options, e.g. set the initial value to
0.5 globally (non-informative prior), or set the initial value
by performing static analysis on the code of the components
and pinpointing high-risk ones.
7. Visualization and deployment
Visualization: The visual representation of calculated
trust and certainty values is essential to actually aid users
in decision-making processes. Consequently, we based
the design of our visualization module on T-Viz [24], a
tested foundation evaluated in various user studies. We
migrated T-Viz to the field of software security and added
a representation of the security history of the component
as help to the system administrator. In Figure 12, we
can see the trustworthiness assessment of our full-fledged
installation, focusing on the components that have the
lowest trustworthiness score (expectation). The lengths of
the slices represent the trust values calculated for each
component, their width show the associated certainty,
their color characterize the expectation, and the value in
the middle the trustworthiness (expected quality) of the
system as a whole. The slices are clickable and produce a
detailed report on the component, including the smoothed
time-series of the actual vulnerabilities (blue), as well as
the time-series produced by the prediction mechanism (red).
Although we conducted informal interviews that generated
positive comments about the visualization of Figure 12, an
extensive user study would be beneficial. However, this is
out of scope of this paper.
Deployment: After going through the empirical and theo-
retical foundations of M-STAR, we proceed to showcase the
utility of our system by providing sample use-cases. First,
we compare the trustworthiness of two Debian packages,
namely firefox-esr and linux (kernel package). Then, we
compare the trustworthiness of two systems, where one is a
full-fledged Debian installation for general use and the other
is a web server. Finally, we assess the security of a fictional
system comprised of the two aforementioned systems, in a
configuration, where there is a 1+1 redundancy. The results
are summarized in Table 4. The first three columns show the
computed parameters of the CertainTrust model, the fourth
the resulting expectation score, followed by an “equivalent”
expected number of vulnerabilities, the actual number, and
the ratios of the equivalent and actual vulnerabilities along
with their normalized error. The latter expresses the error in
the expectation about the relative quality of two configura-
tions. We observe that M-STAR assesses the relative quality
of the two systems with an error of less than 10%. The
calibrating parameters of the system can be modified over
time by the user / administrator, so the equivalent number
of vulnerabilities estimates the actual number more closely.
However, the issue of accurately predicting the absolute
number of vulnerabilities requires further investigation. For
the 1-out-of-2 scenario, we observe that there is a rather
small 7% decrease in the equivalent vulnerability number
w.r.t. the single web server, which is expected as the two
systems have a lot of components in common. In this case,
more software diversity would be required to achieve a better
security level.
TABLE 4. TRUST ASSESSMENT OF DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONS
t c f expectation equivalent number actual number ratio equivalent ratio actual ratio norm. error
linux 0.968 0.966 0.974 0.968 35 70 0.673 0.833 0.192firefox 0.950 0.920 0.974 0.952 52 84
Full-fledged 0.687 0.662 0.502 0.625 405 809 1.770 1.954 0.094Web server 0.840 0.690 0.673 0.788 229 414
1-out-of-2 0.842 0.693 0.710 0.802 214 – – – –
Figure 12. Trustworthiness assessment of the full-fledged system.
8. Related Work
We first present some significant recent work in the area
of vulnerability discovery, which is adjacent and compli-
mentary to our work, and then discuss related work in the
field of predicting vulnerable software components. Finally,
we go over work in the field of software risk and trustwor-
thiness assessment.
Vulnerabilities and malware discovery. There is a lot
of ongoing work in the field of automatic vulnerability
discovery in software. In [25], the authors combine tech-
niques from static analysis and machine learning to identify
missing checks that lead to vulnerabilities in several soft-
ware projects, like the Linux kernel and Pidgin. In [26], a
novel representation of code, namely code property graphs,
are introduced and their usefulness in identifying software
vulnerabilities is showcased, while [27] deals with the auto-
mated finding of taint-style vulnerabilities. Other approaches
that make use of virtualization and other forms of dynamic
analysis techniques have been recently proposed, e.g. in
Digtool [7], which finds vulnerabilities at the binary level,
in [28] where differential testing is used, in [9] where the
authors use fuzzing in combination with symbolic execution,
and in [8] where hardware-assisted fuzzing is established.
Regarding automated discovery and classification of mal-
ware, [29] offers a lightweight tool for detection of malware
in Android. Our work is orthogonal, but complimentary to
the contributions highlighted above, in the sense that they
handle specific cases of vulnerabilities and as seen in the
real world, even when related discovery tools are employed,
end products still contain a multitude of vulnerabilities.
Techniques similar to the above can also act as evidence
sources for M-STAR’s trustworthiness calculation.
Vulnerabilities prediction. The area of predicting which
software components are more likely to contain vulnerabil-
ities has also yielded some prominent results. The pioneer-
ing work of Neuhaus et al. [30] analyzed C/C++ files of
the Mozilla codebase and classified them as vulnerable or
not using SVMs. Specifically, components that had similar
imports and function calls were shown likely to share vul-
nerability status. In [31], the authors leverage dependency
relationships to classify Red Hat linux packages, whereas in
[32], text mining of the source code is employed to predict
if a given component is vulnerable. Finally, in [33], linear
autoregressive models are shown to be reasonably accurate
at forecasting vulnerabilities, and in [34], a comparison
of proposed prediction techniques is performed on Linux
kernel components.
Software trustworthiness and risk. Research regarding
the trustworthiness of software, especially w.r.t. its security
properties goes back to the Trusted Software Methodology
[35], a process-oriented methodology developed in the 90’s.
In a recent report [36], NIST proposes a framework for
assessing software trustworthiness by weighting in evalu-
ations carried out either by automatic code checkers or
by experts, in order to deduce an overall trustworthiness
assessment for the component under question. Our system
on the contrary does not rely on expert opinions, although
our model can readily accommodate them. Our work is most
closely related to that of Bugiel et al. [37], where the authors
propose a tool for software trustworthiness assessment of
Debian systems. Although this work served as an inspiration
to our system, our work differs considerably in nature,
mainly because it provides a mathematically and empirically
verified solution to trustworthiness assessment, contrary to
the ad-hoc approach of the aforementioned paper.
9. Conclusion, Limitations and future work
In this paper we presented M-STAR, a complete frame-
work for assessing the trustworthiness of software systems.
M-STAR’s modular design offers adaptability to various use-
cases and different technologies. We employ state-of-the-
art prediction techniques and Bayesian probabilistic models,
known as computational trust models, in order to model and
calculate our trustworthiness assessments. Our prototype,
written in python, will be made publicly available as a web
interface, and the code will be published on github. During
our detailed investigation of vulnerabilities in the Debian
ecosystem, we came to the conclusion that proactive tech-
niques like M-STAR are necessary, as there is no observable
decrease in the vulnerability rate of software in Debian, even
when considering single versions of software.
We believe that M-STAR is an important contribution
towards assessing the real-world security of systems. How-
ever, M-STAR is only a first step towards this goal and
consequently exhibits some limitations, which should be
addressed in future work. Namely, experimenting with other
datasets (other than Debian) and different prediction tech-
niques, would be highly beneficial, as static and dynamic
analysis tools become more generic and accurate. Further-
more, deploying M-STAR in the wild and performing user
studies among system administrators regarding the impact
of M-STAR’s assessments on their choices, would also be
interesting.
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Appendix A.
CertainLogic standard (logical) operators
CertainLogic ANDct (∧ct) Operator: The operator ∧ct
is applicable when opinions about two independent propo-
sitions need to be combined in order to produce a new
opinion reflecting the degree of truth of both propositions
simultaneously. Note that the opinions are represented using
the CertainTrust model. The rationale behind the definitions
of the logical operators of CertainTrust (e.g., ANDct (∧ct))
demands an analytical discussion.
In standard binary logic, logical operators operate on
propositions that only consider the values ‘TRUE’ or
‘FALSE’ (i.e., 1 or 0 respectively) as input arguments. In
standard probabilistic logic, the logical operators operates
on propositions that consider values in the range of [0, 1]
(i.e., probabilities) as input arguments. However, logical
operators in the standard probabilistic approach are not
able to consider uncertainty about the probability values.
Subjective Logic’s [16] logical operators are able to operate
on opinions that consider uncertain probabilities as input ar-
guments. Additionally, Subjective Logic’s logical operators
are a generalized version of standard logic operators and
probabilistic logic operators.
CertainLogic’s logical operators operate on Certain-
Trust’s opinions, which represent uncertain probabilities in
a more flexible and simple manner than the opinion repre-
sentation in Subjective Logic (SL). Note that CertainTrust’s
representation and Subjective Logic’s representation of opin-
ions are isomorphic with the mapping provided in [38].
For a detailed discussion on the representational model of
Subjective Logic’s opinions and CertainTrust’s opinions, we
refer the readers to Chapter 2 of [39]. The definitions of
CertainLogic’s logical operators are formulated in a way
so that they are equivalent to the definitions of logical
operators in Subjective Logic. This equivalence serves as
an argument for the justification and mathematical validity
of CertainLogic logical operators’ definitions. Moreover,
these operators are a generalization of binary logic and
probabilistic logic operators.
Definition 4 (Operator ANDct). Let A and B be two
independent propositions and the opinions about the truth
of these propositions be given as oA = (tA, cA, fA) and
oB = (tB , cB , fB), respectively. Then, the resulting opinion
is denoted as oA∧ctB = (tA∧ctB , cA∧ctB , fA∧ctB) where
tA∧ctB , cA∧ctB , and fA∧ctB are defined in Table 5 (AND).
We use the symbol ’∧ct’ to designate the operator ANDct
and we define oA∧ctB ≡ oA ∧ct oB .
The aggregation (using the ANDct operator) of opinions
about independent propositions A and B are formulated in
a way that the resulting initial expectation (f ) is dependent
on the initial expectation values, fA and fB assigned to A
and B respectively. Following the equivalent definitions of
Subjective Logic’s normal conjunction operator and basic
characteristics of the same operator (∧) in standard prob-
abilistic logic, we define fA∧ctB = fAfB . The definitions
for cA∧ctB and tA∧ctB are formulated in similar manner
and the corresponding adjustments in the definitions are
made to maintain the equivalence between the operators of
Subjective Logic and CertainLogic. The ANDct (∧ct) op-
erator of CertainLogic is associative and commutative; both
properties are desirable for the evaluation of propositional
logic terms (PLTs).
CertainLogic ORct (∨ct) Operator: The operator ∨ct is
applicable when opinions about two independent proposi-
tions need to form a new opinion reflecting the degree of
truth for at least one out of two propositions.
Definition 5 (Operator ORct). Let A and B be two
independent propositions and the opinions about the truth
of these propositions be given as oA = (tA, cA, fA) and
oB = (tB , cB , fB), respectively. Then, the resulting opinion
is denoted as oA∨ctB = (tA∨ctB , cA∨ctB , fA∨ctB) where
tA∨ctB , cA∨ctB , and fA∨ctB are defined in Table 5 (ORct).
We use the symbol ’∨ct’ to designate the operator ORct
and we define oA∨ctB ≡ oA ∨ct oB .
The aggregation (using the ORct operator) of opinions
about independent propositions A and B is formulated in
a way that the resulting initial expectation (f ) is dependent
on the initial expectation values, fA and fB assigned to
A and B respectively. Following the equivalent definitions
of Subjective Logic’s normal disjunction operator and the
basic characteristics of the same operator (∨) in standard
probabilistic logic, we define fA∨ctB = fA + fB − fAfB .
The definitions for cA∨ctB and tA∨ctB are formulated in
similar manner and the corresponding adjustments in the
definitions are made to maintain the equivalence between
the operators of Subjective Logic and CertainLogic. The
ORct (∨ct) operator of CertainLogic is associative and
commutative; both properties are desirable for the evaluation
of PLTs.
Appendix B.
CertainLogic non-standard (FUSION) opera-
tors
Assume that one wants to fuse conflicting opin-
ions (about a proposition) derived from multiple sources.
In this case, one should use the conflict-aware fusion
(C.FUSION ) operator as defined in [39]. This operator
operates on dependent conflicting opinions and reflects the
calculated degree of conflict (DoC) in the resulting fused
opinion. Note that the C.FUSION operator is also able to
deal with preferential weights associated with opinions.
Definition 6 (C.FUSION ). Let A be a proposition and
let oA1 = (tA1 , cA1 , fA1), oA2 = (tA2 , cA2 , fA2),· · · , oAn =
(tAn , cAn , fAn) be n opinions associated to A. Furthermore,
the weights w1, w2,· · · , wn (with w1, w2, · · · , wn ∈ R+0
and w1 +w2 + · · ·+wn 6= 0) are assigned to the opinions
oA1 , oA2 ,· · · , oAn , respectively. The conflict-aware fusion
is denoted as
o⊕̂c(A1,··· ,An) =
= ((t⊕̂c(A1,··· ,An), c⊕̂c(A1,··· ,An), f⊕̂c(A1,··· ,An)), DoC)
where t⊕̂c(A1,··· ,An), c⊕̂c(A1,··· ,An), f⊕̂c(A1,··· ,An),
and the degree of conflict DoC are defined in Table 7. We
use the symbol (⊕̂c) to designate the operator C.FUSION
and we define:
o⊕̂c(A1,··· ,An) ≡ ⊕̂c((oA1 , w1), (oA2 , w2), · · · , (oAn , wn))
The conflict-aware fusion (C.FUSION ) operator is
commutative and idempotent, but not associative.
The rationale behind the definition of the conflict-aware
fusion demands an extensive discussion. The basic concept
of this operator is that the operator extends CertainLogic’s
Weighted fusion [40] operator by calculating the degree of
conflict (DoC) between a pair of opinions. Then, the value
of (1−DoC) is multiplied with the certainty (c) that would
be calculated by the weighted fusion (the parameters for t
and f are the same as in the weighted fusion).
Now, we discuss the calculation of the DoC for two
opinions. For the parameter, it holds DoC ∈ [0, 1]. This
parameter depends on the trust value (t), the certainty values
(c), and the weights (w). The weights are assumed to be
selected by the trustors (consumers) and the purpose of the
weights is to model the preferences of the trustor when
aggregating opinions from different sources. We assume that
the compliance of their preferences are ensured under a
policy negotiation phase. For example, users might be given
three choices, High (2), Low (1) and No preference (0, i.e.,
opinion from a particular source is not considered), to ex-
press their preferences on selecting the sources that provide
the opinions. Note that the weights are not introduced to
model the reliability of sources. In this case, it would be
appropriate to use the discounting operator [16], [38] to
explicitly consider reliability of sources and apply the fusion
operator on the results to influence users’ preferences. The
values of DoC can be interpreted as follows:
• No conflict (DoC = 0): For DoC = 0, it holds that
there is no conflict between the two opinions. This
is true if both opinions agree on the trust value, i.e.,
tA1 = tA2 or in case that at least one opinion has a
certainty c = 0 (for completeness we have to state
that it is also true if one of the weights is equal to
0, which means the opinion is not considered).
• Total conflict (DoC = 1): For DoC = 1, it holds
that the two opinions are weighted equally (w1 =
w2) and contradicts each other to a maximum. This
means, that both opinions have a maximum certainty
(cA1 = cA2 = 1) and maximum divergence in the
trust values, i.e., tA1 = 0 and tA2 = 1 (or tA1 = 1
and tA2 = 0).
• Conflict (DoC ∈]0, 1[): For DoC ∈]0, 1[, it holds
that there are two opinions contradict each other to
a certain degree. This means that the both opinions
does not agree on the trust values, i.e., tA1 6= tA2 ,
having certainty values other than 0 and 1. The
weights can be any real number other than 0.
TABLE 5. DEFINITION OF THE OPERATOR ANDct (∧ct)
ANDct
cA∧ctB =
{
cA + cB − cAcB − (1−cA)cB(1−fA)tB+cA(1−cB)(1−fB)tA1−fAfB if fAfB 6= 1,
“undefined” else.
tA∧ctB =
{
1
c
A∧ctB
(
cAcBtAtB +
cA(1−cB)(1−fA)fBtA+(1−cA)cBfA(1−fB)tB
1−fAfB
)
if cA∧ctB 6= 0 and fAfB 6= 1,
0.5 else.
fA∧ctB =fAfB
TABLE 6. DEFINITION OF THE OPERATOR ORct (∨ct)
ORct
cA∨ctB =
{
cA + cB − cAcB − cA(1−cB)fB(1−tA)+(1−cA)cBfA(1−tB)fA+fB−fAfB if fAfB 6= 0,
“undefined” else.
tA∨ctB =
{
1
c
A∨ctB
(cAtA + cBtB − cAcBtAtB) if cA∨ctB 6= 0,
0.5 else.
fA∨ctB =fA + fB − fAfB
TABLE 7. DEFINITION OF THE CONFLICT-AWARE FUSION OPERATOR
t⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An) =

n∑
i=1
witAi
n∑
i=1
wi
if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1 ,
0.5 if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 0 ,
n∑
i=1
(cAi tAiwi
n∏
j=1, j 6=i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(cAiwi
n∏
j=1, j 6=i
(1− cAj ))
if {cAi , cAj } 6= 1 .
c⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An) =

1 ∗ (1−DoC) if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1 ,
n∑
i=1
(cAiwi
n∏
j=i+1
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(wi
n∏
j=1, j 6=i
(1− cAj ))
∗ (1−DoC) if {cAi , cAj } 6= 1 .
f⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An) =
n∑
i=1
wifAi
n∑
i=1
wi
DoC =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
DoCAi,Aj
n(n−1)
2
DoCAi,Aj =
∣∣∣tAi − tAj ∣∣∣ ∗ cAi ∗ cAj ∗ (1− ∣∣∣∣wi − wjwi + wj
∣∣∣∣)
Next, we argue for integrating the degree of conflict,
DoC, into the resulting opinion by multiplying the certainty
with (1−DoC). The argument is, in case that there are two
(equally weighted) conflicting opinions, then this indicates
that the information which these opinions are based on
is not representative for the outcome of the assessment
or experiment. Thus, for the sake of representativeness, in
the case of total conflict (i.e., DoC = 1), we reduce the
certainty (c(oA1 ,w1)⊕̂(oA2 ,w2)) of the resulting opinion by a
multiplicative factor, (1−DoC). The certainty value is 0 in
this case.
For n opinions, degree of conflict (i.e., DoCAi,Aj ) in
Table 7 is calculated for each opinion pairs. For instance,
if there are n opinions there can be at most n(n−1)2 pairs
and degree of conflict is calculated for each of those pairs
individually. Then, all the pair-wise DoC values are aver-
aged, i.e., averaging n(n−1)2 pairs of DoCAi,Aj . Finally, the
certainty (i.e., c⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An)) parameter of the resulting
opinion (see Table 7) is adjusted with the resulting DoC
value.
In Table 7, for all opinions if it holds cAi = 0 (complete
uncertainty), the expectation values depends only on f .
However, for soundness we define tAi = 0.5 in this case.
Appendix C.
Deployment scenarios
After describing M-STAR in the previous sections, we
proceed with proposing and discussing two possible deploy-
ment scenarios for our system.
Software installation process: Our first scenario is using
M-STAR’s assessments to assist a system administrator
understand and minimize the security risks of their system
configuration. For example, more risky components can be
substituted by more trustworthy ones with equivalent func-
tionality. Figure 12 shows the trustworthiness assessment of
a Debian system, the components of which are considered
equally critical to the security of the system. This is due to
the fact that vulnerabilities of any of the components can
lead to an adversary taking control of the system.
To fully exploit the rich expressiveness of M-STAR’s
trust modeling and the logical operators in our disposal (see
Section 6.2), we can apply M-STAR to the problem of risk
assessment and minimization, in the context of Secure Mul-
tiparty Computation (SMC). SMC was initially introduced
by Yao [41] for the two-party setting and soon extended to
the multi-party setting. The basic idea of SMC in the client-
server model, is that m servers can run an algorithm with
input data provided by the clients in secret-shared format
and generate an output without learning anything about the
input data of the clients, assuming k− out− of −m of the
servers are honest. Although SMC remained a theoretical
construct for many years, recent advances have allowed
the realization of the concept, as seen e.g. in the use-case
of anonymous messaging [42]. One of the main practical
issues of SMC is that the software configurations of the
servers is critical to guaranteeing that a vulnerability of a
software component cannot affect more than k servers, thus
breaking the security of the whole system. As we showcased
in Section 6.2 for the case of 1 − out − of − 2 servers,
systems administrators can use M-STAR to maximize the
overall trustworthiness of multi-server systems by adapting
their software configurations.
Trust-based access control: Traditional access control
models are based solely on cryptographic credentials. How-
ever, assessing only the identity of the party requesting
access to potentially valuable information overlooks the
possibility that the device used by the otherwise honest
party is not trustworthy. Consequently, using trust and risk
in access control policies was proposed, e.g. in [43] and
more recently in the case of Intel in [44]. M-STAR trust
scores can be readily used in access control models of this
kind, providing a well-founded and probabilistic measure of
trustworthiness w.r.t. the software configuration of the party
requesting access.
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Figure 13. The distribution of vulnerabilities in the Debian ecosystem (years
2001-2016). The scale of axis y is logarithmic. All packages are taken into
account. Every tenth package name appears on the x axis for space reasons.
